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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the physical-layer secu-5
rity of cooperative communications relying on multiple two-way6
relays using the decode-and-forward (DF) protocol in the pres-7
ence of an eavesdropper, where the eavesdropper appears to tap8
the transmissions of both the source and of the relay. The design9
tradeoff to be resolved is that the throughput is improved by in-10
voking two-way relaying, but the secrecy of wireless transmissions11
may be degraded, since the eavesdropper may overhear the signals12
transmitted by both the source and relay nodes. We conceive an13
artificial noise aided two-way opportunistic relay selection (ANaT-14
WORS) scheme for enhancing the security of the pair of source15
nodes communicating with the assistance of multiple two-way re-16
lays. Furthermore, we analyze both the outage probability and17
intercept probability of the proposed ANaTWORS scheme, where18
the security and reliability are characterized in terms of the inter-19
cept probability and the security outage probability. For compari-20
son, we also provide the security–reliability tradeoff (SRT) analysis21
of both the traditional direct transmission and of the one-way re-22
laying schemes. It is shown that the proposed ANaTWORS scheme23
outperforms both the conventional direct transmission, as well as24
the one-way relay methods in terms of its SRT. More specifically,25
in the low main-user-to-eavesdropper ratio (MUER) region, the26
proposed ANaTWORS scheme is capable of guaranteeing secure27
transmissions, whereas no SRT gain is achieved by conventional28
one-way relaying. In fact, the one-way relaying scheme may even29
be inferior to the traditional direct transmission scheme in terms30
of its SRT.31
Index Terms—Artificial noise, opportunistic relay selection,32
physical-layer security, security-reliability tradeoff (SRT),33
two-way relay.34
I. INTRODUCTION35
COOPERATIVE relaying has attracted substantial re-36 search interests from both the academic and industrial37
community, since it is capable of mitigating both the shadowing38
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and fast-fading effects of wireless channels. There are two pop- 39
ular relaying protocols, namely the amplify-and-forward (AF) 40
[1], [2] as well as the decode-and-forward (DF) [3], [4]. In the 41
case of AF relaying, the selected relay multiplies its received 42
signals by a gain factor and then forward them to the destination 43
[1], [2]. By contrast, the DF relay decodes its received signals 44
and then the selected relay forward its decoded signal to the 45
destination [3], [4]. Additionally, in [5], both AF and DF relay- 46
ing schemes are investigated. In general, closer to the source, 47
DF relaying has a high probability of successful decoding and 48
flawless retransmission from the relay to the destination from 49
a reduced distance [6]. By contrast, close to the destination the 50
DF relay has just as bad reception as the destination itself, hence 51
it often inflicts error propagation. Fortunately in the vicinity of 52
the destination AF relying tends to outperform DF relaying [6]. 53
Additionally, [7] also shows that adaptive DF outperforms AF 54
in terms of its frame error rate (FER). 55
At the time of writing this paper, physical-layer security [8], 56
[9] in cooperative relay networks is receiving a growing research 57
attention as benefit of its capability of protecting wireless com- 58
munications against eavesdropping attacks. In [10] and [11], the 59
physical-layer security of MIMO-aided relaying networks has 60
been explored, demonstrating that the secrecy capacity can in- 61
deed be improved by using MIMO-aided relays. Additionally, Q162
Tekin and Yener [12] proposed the cooperative jamming philos- 63
ophy, and studied the attainable secrecy rate with the objective of 64
improving the physical-layer security. As a further development, 65
Long et al. [13] investigated cooperative jamming schemes in 66
bidirectional secrecy communications. In [14] and [15], beam- 67
forming techniques have been investigated and significant wire- 68
less secrecy capability improvements were demonstrated with 69
the aid of beamforming techniques. Additionally, the impact of 70
antenna selection on secure two-way relaying communications 71
has been analyzed in [16]. 72
As a design alternative, relay selection schemes may also 73
be used for improving the physical-layer security of wireless 74
communications. One-way relaying has been analyzed in [17]– 75
[24]. Specifically, hybrid relaying and jamming schemes are 76
explored in [17]–[22]. In [17]–[19], joint AF relaying and jam- 77
mer selection schemes have been investigated. Additionally, hy- 78
brid cooperative beamforming and cooperative jamming have 79
been proposed in [20] and [21]. In [22], joint DF relaying and 80
cooperative jamming schemes have been investigated. More- 81
over, in [23], the AF- and DF-based optimal relay selection 82
schemes have been proposed. The associated intercept probabil- 83
ities have also been analyzed in the context of both AF- and DF- 84
based one-way relaying schemes, where an eavesdropper is only 85
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capable of wiretapping the transmissions of the relays. By con-86
trast, in [24], an eavesdropper was tapping the transmissions87
of both the source and of the relays. Moreover, the security-88
reliability tradeoff (SRT) has been explored in the context of the89
proposed opportunistic relay selection scheme in the high main-90
user-to-eavesdropper ratio (MUER) region, where the MUER91
is defined as the ratio of the average channel gain of the main92
links (spanning from the source to the destination) to that of the93
wiretap links (spanning from the source to the eavesdropper).94
Additionally, two-way relaying has been explored in [25]–[31].95
Specifically, Mo et al. [25] investigated two-way AF relaying96
schemes relying on either two slots or three slots demonstrated97
that the three-slot scheme performs better than the two-slot98
scheme, when the transmitted source powers approach zero.99
In [26], DF relaying has been invoked for improving the wire-100
less security of bidirectional communications, where a relay101
is invoked for transmitting artificial noise in order to perturb102
the eavesdropper’s reception both in the first and in the sec-103
ond transmission slot. In [27], joint relay and jammer selection104
of two-way relay networks have been proposed. In [28], Wang105
et al. explored hybrid cooperative beamforming and jamming106
of two-way relay networks. In [29], secure relay and jammer se-107
lection was conceived for the physical-layer security improve-108
ment of a wireless network having multiple intermediate nodes109
and eavesdroppers, where the links between the source and the110
eavesdropper are not considered. In [30], three different cat-111
egories of relay and jammer selection have been considered,112
where the channel coefficients between the legitimate nodes113
and the eavesdroppers are used both for relay selection and for114
jammer selection. In [31], a wireless network consisting of two115
source nodes is considered and multiple DF relay nodes are116
involved in the presence of a single eavesdropper. The outage117
probability (OP) has been analyzed for the two-way DF scheme118
relying on three transmission slots.119
Motivated by the above considerations, we investigate a wire-120
less network supporting a pair of source nodes with the aid of N121
two-way DF relays in the presence of an eavesdropper. In con-122
trast to [17]–[24], we explore a two-way relaying aided wireless123
network. Furthermore, we propose an artificial noise aided two-124
way opportunistic relay selection (ANaTWORS) scheme, and125
analyze the SRT of the wireless network investigated. Due to the126
channel state information (CSI) estimation error, it is impossible127
to guarantee that no interference is received at the relay nodes,128
caused by the specially designed artificial noise. Moreover, the129
impact of the artificial noise both on the relays and on the130
eavesdropper is characterized, which will be taken into account131
when evaluating the wireless SRT of the proposed ANaTWORS132
scheme. Against this background, the main contributions of this133
paper are summarized as follows.134
First, we propose an ANaTWORS scheme for protecting the135
ongoing transmissions against eavesdropping. To be specific, in136
the first time slot, S1 transmits its signals to the relays, and S2137
transmits artificial noise in order to protect the signals trans-138
mitted by S1 against eavesdropping. Similarly to the first time139
slot, S2 transmits its signals to the relays in the second time140
slot under the protection of artificial noise transmitted by S1. In141
Fig. 1. Wireless network consisting of a pair of source S1, S2, and N relays
in the presence of an eavesdropper E .
the third time slot, the relay forward the encoded signals to S1 142
and S2. 143
Second, we present the mathematical SRT analysis of the pro- 144
posed ANaTWORS scheme in the presence of artificial noise 145
imposed both on the relays and on the eavesdropper for trans- 146
mission over Rayleigh fading channels. Moreover, we assume 147
that the teletraffic of S1 and S2 is different. Closed-form ex- 148
pressions are obtained both for the OP and for the intercept 149
probability (IP) of both S1 and S2. 150
Finally, it is shown that as the impact of artificial noise on the 151
main link is reduced and on the wiretap link is increased, the 152
SRT of the proposed ANaTWORS scheme is improved. Fur- 153
thermore, our performance evaluations reveal that the proposed 154
ANaOTWRS scheme consistently outperforms both the tradi- 155
tional direct transmission regime and the one-way transmission 156
scheme [24] in terms of its SRT. 157
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, 158
we briefly characterize the physical-layer security of a two-way 159
wireless network. In Section III, the SRT analysis of the con- 160
ventional direct transmission scheme as well as of the proposed 161
ANaOTWRS scheme communicating over a Rayleigh chan- 162
nel is carried out. Our performance evaluations are detailed in 163
Section IV. Finally, in Section V, we conclude the paper. 164
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND RELAY SELECTION 165
A. System Model 166
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a wireless network con- 167
sisting of a pair of source nodes, denoted by S1 and S2, plus 168
N two-way DF relays, denoted by Ri , i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, which 169
communicate in the presence of an eavesdropper E, where 170
E is assumed to be within the coverage area of S1, S2, and 171
Ri . All nodes are equipped with a single antenna. We assume 172
that there is no direct link between S1 and S2 due to the path 173
loss. Furthermore, in the spirit of [21], both the main and the 174
wiretap links are modeled by Rayleigh fading channels, where 175
the main and wiretap links are represented by the solid and 176
dashed lines in Fig. 1, respectively. Let hs1i , hs2i , hs1e , and 177
hs2e , i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, represent the S1 −Ri , S2 −Ri , S1 − E, 178
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and S2 − E channel gains, respectively. We assume that the179
channel coefficients hs1i , hs2i , hs1e , and hs2e are mutually inde-180
pendent zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables (RVs)181
with variances of σ2s1i , σ
2
s2i




over, we assume that the S1 −Ri and S2 −Ri links are recip-183
rocal, i.e., we have, hs1i = his1 and hs2i = his2 . For simplicity,184















e , where σ2m and σ2e represent the average chan-186
nel gains of the main links and of the wiretap links, respec-187
tively. Moreover, let λme = σ2m/σ2e , which is referred to as the188
MUER.189
The thermal noise of any node is modeled as a complex Gaus-190
sian random variable with a zero mean and a variance of N0,191
denoted by ns1 , ns2 , ni , and ne , respectively. Following [31],192
the operation of the two-way DF scheme relying on opportunis-193
tic relay selection is split into three time slots. We assume that194
the nodes in the network are synchronized with each other. In195
the first time slot, S1 transmits its signal, denoted by xs1 to the196
relays, and then S2 transmits the artificial noise ωs2 simultane-197
ously. In the second time slot, S2 transmits its signal xs2 to the198
relays and S1 transmits artificial noise simultaneously. In the199
third time slot, the selected relay forward the signal xr to both200
S1 and S2, where we have xr = xs1 ⊕ xs2 , and ⊕ denotes the201
XOR operation. Furthermore, the proposed relay selection can202
be coordinated by relying on a distributed pattern (governed by203
a timer). Without loss of generality, we assume E[|xsj |2] = 1,204
E[|ωsj |2] = N0, j = 1, 2.205
Furthermore, we also assume that S1 and S2 have to convey206
different-rate traffic, denoted by Rs1 and Rs2 , respectively. For207
comparison, the one-way relaying scheme (ORS) of [24] can208
be simply extended to a two-way scenario relying on four time209
slots. To be specific, S1 transmits its signals to the relays in210
the first time slot, S2 transmits its signals to the relays in the211
second time slot, and the selected relay forward the decoded212
signals to S2 and S1 in the third time slot and the fourth time213
slot, respectively.214
B. Two-Way Relaying Scheme215
In this section, we first consider the physical-layer security216
of the two-way relaying scheme. We then propose our ANaT-217
WORS arrangement.218
1) S1 and S2 Transmit: In the first time slot, S1 transmits its219
signal to the relays under the protection of artificial noise trans-220
mitted by S2. For the sake of a fair power consumption com-221
parison with both the direct transmission and the ORS schemes,222
the total transmit power of S1 and S2 is constrained to Ps , thus223
the transmit powers of S1 and S2 are denoted by Ps/2. As men-224
tioned above, it is impossible to guarantee that the artificial noise225
perfectly lies in the null space of the S1 −Ri channels, due to226
the ubiquitous CSI estimation error, hence leading to a certain227
interference received at Ri . The impact of the artificial noise on228
Ri is quantified by α. The signals received at Ri transmitted by229





αPs/2ωs2 + ni. (1)








α|hs2i |2γs + 2
)
(2)
where the factor 1/3 arises from the fact that three orthogonal 233
time slots are required for completing the signal transmission 234
from S1 to S2 via Ri . 235
Naturally, the artificial noise is specially designed to interfere 236
with the eavesdropper. However, its perturbation imposed on the 237
eavesdropper may be imperfect due to CSI estimation errors, 238
which is characterized by β. Hence, the signals received at E 239





βPs/2ωs2 + ne. (3)








β|hs2e |2γs + 2
)
. (4)
In the second time slot, S2 transmits its signals to the relay 243
nodes, and S1 simultaneously transmits artificial noise. Sim- 244






αPs/2ωs1 + ni. (5)







α|hs1i |2γs + 2
)
. (6)






βPs/2ωs1 + ne, (7)







β|hs1e |2γs + 2
)
. (8)
2) Decoding Set: In this section, we analyze the suc- 251
cessful decoding set of the wireless network portrayed in 252
Fig. 1. As shown in [24], the resultant successful de- 253
coding set of the ORS scheme is given by Ω, where 254
Ω = {φ,D1,D2, . . . , Dn , . . . ,D2N −1}, φ denotes the empty 255
set and Φn represents the nth nonempty subset of the N re- 256
lays, n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2N − 1}. The successful decoding sets of 257
the relays defined as those that are capable of successfully 258
decoding xs1 and xs2 are denoted by Ω1 and Ω2, respec- 259
tively. Consequently, the set of the relays that successfully 260
decode both xs1 and xs2 is denoted by Ψ, which is formu- 261
lated as Ψ = {φ,Φ1,Φ2, . . . ,Φn , . . . ,Φ2N −1}, where we have 262
Ψ = Ω1 ∩ Ω2. 263
For example, the decoding sets of Ωj and Ψ have been shown 264
as Table I, where we have N = 3 and j ∈ {1, 2}. 265
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TABLE I
DECODING SETS OF Ωj AND Ψ, WHEN N = 3 AND WHEN j ∈ {1, 2}
As mentioned above, the event of Φ = φ can be characterized266
as267
Cs1i < Rs1 or Cs2i < Rs2 , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} (9)
while the event of Φ = Φn can be expressed as268
Cs1i > Rs1 and Cs2i > Rs2 , i ∈ Φn
Cs1j < Rs1 or Cs2j < Rs2 , j ∈ Φ¯n (10)
where Φ¯n represents the complementary set of Φn .269
3) Relay Transmits: Without loss of generality, here we as-270
sume that Ri is selected from the set Φn . Then the selected relay271
Ri broadcasts the encoded signal xr to S1 and S2. The signals272
received at S1 from Ri can be written as273
ys1 (i) = his1
√
Psxr + ns1 . (11)
The source S1 may invoke successive interference cancelation274
(SIC), thus, (18) can be written as275
ys1 (i) = his1
√
Psxs2 + ns1 . (12)





1 + |his1 |2γs
)
. (13)
Similarly, S2 can also invoke SIC, thus the signals received277
at S2 from Ri can be written as278
ys2 (i) = his2
√
Psxs1 + ns2 . (14)





1 + |his2 |2γs
)
. (15)
The signals received at E from Ri can be written as280
yie = hie
√
Psxr + ne = hie
√
Ps (xs1 ⊕ xs2) + ne. (16)
4) An Optimal Two-Way Relay Selection Criterion: In281
this section, we present the relay selection criterion of the282
ANaTWORS scheme, which can be given by 283
o = arg max
i∈Φn






|his1 |2, |his2 |2
)]
(17)
where o denotes the selected optimal relay. Moreover, from a 284
more practical point of view, the CSIs |his1 |2 and |his2 |2 can be 285
estimated in practical wireless communications, using channel 286
estimation schemes [32]. 287
5) Condition of Intercept Event: In theΦ = φ case, an eaves- 288
dropper can successfully wiretap the signal transmitted by S1, 289
when Css1e > Rs1 . 290
In the Φ = Φn and Css1e > Rs1 case, an eavesdropper can 291
successfully wiretap the signal transmitted by S1. 292
In the Φ = Φn and Css1e < Rs1 scenario, if C
s
s2e
< Rs2 , an 293
eavesdropper cannot successfully wiretap the signal transmit- 294




Psxs1 + ne. (18)





1 + |hoe |2γs
)
. (19)
Clearly, in the Φ = Φn and Css1e < Rs1 case, an eavesdropper 298
can only successfully wiretap the signal transmitted by S1 when 299
Css2e > Rs2 and Coe > Rs1 . 300
Similarly, we can formulate the condition of an eavesdropper 301
successfully wiretapping the signal transmitted by S2 as 302
In the Φ = φ case, an eavesdropper can successfully wiretap 303
the signal transmitted by S2, provided that Css2e > Rs2 . 304
In the Φ = Φn and Css2e > Rs2 scenario, an eavesdropper can 305
successfully wiretap the signal transmitted by S2. 306
In the Φ = Φn , Css2e < Rs2 , C
s
s1e
> Rs1 , and Coe > Rs2 307
case, an eavesdropper can successfully wiretap the signal trans- 308
mitted by S1. 309
III. SECURITY–RELIABILITY TRADEOFF ANALYSIS 310
OVER RAYLEIGH FADING CHANNELS 311
In this section, we analyze both the OP and IP of the proposed 312
ANaTWORS schemes over Rayleigh fading channels. 313
A. SRT Analysis of the Proposed ANaTWORS Scheme 314
1) SRT Analysis of S1: In the ANaTWORS scheme, a relay 315
will only be chosen from the set Φn . With the aid of Shannon 316
[33] and the law of total probability [34], the OP of the S1 → S2 317
link relying on the ANaTWORS scheme can be formulated as 318




Pr (Cos2 < Rs1 ,Φ = Φn ). (20)
In the case of Φ = φ, no relay is chosen for forwarding the 319
signals, which leads to Cos2 = 0 for Φ = φ. Thus, (20) can be 320
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rewritten as321
P singleout s1 = Pr (Φ = φ) +
2N −1∑
n=1
Pr (Cos2 < Rs1 ,Φ = Φn ). (21)
Based on (9) and (10), (21) can be expressed as322





















































|hos2 |2 < Δ1
))
(22)
where we have Δ1 = (23·Rs 1 − 1)/γs , and Δ2 =323
(23·Rs 2 − 1)/γs .324
Based on Appendix A, Pr( |hs 1i |
2
α |hs 2i |2γs +2















































































































































































Substituting (23) and (24) into (22), P singleout s1 can be obtained. 330
In our ANaTWORS scheme, an eavesdropper can overhear 331
the signals transmitted by S1, S2, and Ri . Using the law of total 332
probability [34] and the definition of an intercept event, we can 333
express the IP of the S1 → E link as 334
P singleint s1 = Pr
(














Css1e < Rs1 , C
s
s2e




Using (4), (8), and (19), (25) can be expressed as 335
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|hoe |2 > Δ1
)]
. (26)
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Substituting (27) and (28) into (26), P singleint s1 can be obtained.341
2) SRT Analysis of S2: Similarly to S1, the OP of S2 can be342
expressed as343
P singleout s2 = Pr (Φ = φ) +
2N −1∑
n=1
Pr (Cos1 < Rs2 ,Φ = Φn ). (29)
Meanwhile, the IP of S2 can be shown to obey344
P singleint s2 = Pr
(














Css2e < Rs2 , C
s
s1e




Clearly, P singleout s2 and P
single
int s2 can be obtained similarly to P
single
out s1 345
and P singleint s1 . 346
3) SRT analysis of S1 and S2: The IP and OP of the pair 347
of sources is defined as the average IP and OP of S1 and S2, 348
respectively: 349
P singleint =












IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 351
For comparison, the SRT analysis of the conventional direct 352
transmission scheme operating without relays is also provided. 353
The total IP and OP of S1 and S2 with the traditional direct 354
transmission scheme is defined as 355
P directint =












respectively, wherein P directint s1 , P
direct
int s2 , P
direct
out s1 , and P
direct
out s2 357
are given by P directint s1 = exp(− Λ1σ 2s 1e ), P
direct
int s2 = exp(− Λ2σ 2s 2e ), 358
P directout s1 = 1− exp(− Λ1σ 2s 1s 2 ), and P
direct
out s2 = 1− exp(− Λ2σ 2s 2s 2 ), re- 359
spectively. Moreover, we have Λ1 = (22Rs 1 − 1)/γs and Λ2 = 360
(22Rs 2 − 1)/γs . Noting that σ2s2s1 , σ2s1e , and σ2s2e are the 361
expected values of the RVs |hs2s1 |2, |hs1e |2, and |hs2e |2, 362
respectively. 363
In this section, we present both our numerical and simulation 364
results for the traditional direct transmission, as well as for 365
the ORS [24] and for the ANaTWORS schemes in terms of 366
their SRTs. Moreover, the analytic IP versus OP results of the 367
direct transmission and ANaTWORS schemes are obtained by 368
plotting (33), (34), (31), and (32), respectively. It is pointed that 369
the IP versus OP results of the ORS scheme are calculated from 370
(27) and (19) of [24], where α is rewritten as (24Rd − 1)/γs . 371
Throughout this performance evaluation, we assumed αs1i = 372
αs2i = αs1e = αs2e = αs1s2 = 1. 373
We first consider the effect of different MUERs. Fig. 2 de- 374
picts the SRTs of both the direct transmission, of the ORS [24] 375
and of the ANaTWORS schemes for different MUERs. Both 376
the numerical and simulation results characterizing the SRT 377
of the ANaTWORS scheme are provided in this figure. Ob- 378
serve from Fig. 2 that as the MUER decreases, all the IPs of 379
the direct transmission, of the ORS and of the ANaTWORS 380
schemes are increased, which can be explained by observing 381
that upon decreasing the MUER, an eavesdropper can achieve 382
a higher achievable rate. Moreover, Fig. 2 also illustrates that 383
the proposed ANaTWORS scheme generally has a lower IP 384
than the traditional direct transmission and ORS regime for 385
MUER = 3 dB and MUER = 0 dB. Additionally, the dif- 386
ference between the analytic and simulated IP versus OP curves 387
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Fig. 2. IP versus OP of the direct transmission, ORS, and ANaTWORS
schemes for different MUERs λm e and for N = 8, which were calculated
from [24, (33), (34) and [27]], [(24), (19)], and (31) and (32).
Fig. 3. IP versus OP of the direct transmission, ORS and ANaTWORS
schemes for different number of relays associated with an MUER of λm e =
0 dB, which were calculated from [24, (33), (34) and [27]], [(24), (19)], and
(31) and (32).
of the ANaTWORS scheme is negligible, demonstrating the388
accuracy of our SRT analysis.389
In Fig. 3, we show the IP verus OP performance of both the di-390
rect transmission, as well as of the ORS and of the ANaTWORS391
scheme for different number of relays N . We can observe from392
Fig. 3 that as the number of relays N increases from N = 4393
to 8, the IP of all schemes is reduced at a specific OP, which394
means that increasing the number of relays improves the security395
versus reliability tradeoff of wireless transmissions. Addition-396
ally, Fig. 3 also demonstrates that IP versus OP performance397
of the proposed ANaTWORS scheme is better than that of the398
direct transmission and of the ORS schemes for all the N values399
considered.400
Fig. 4. IP versus OP of the direct transmission, ORS, OSJ-MMISR, and
ANaTWORS schemes for different α and β associated with an MUER of
λm e = 0 dB, N = 8, which were calculated from [24, (33), (34) and [27]],
[(24), (19)], and (31) and (32).
Fig. 4 illustrates the IP versus OP of both the direct trans- 401
mission, as well as of the ORS, of the optimal selection 402
with jamming with max–min instantaneous secrecy rate (OSJ- 403
MMISR) [30] and of the ANaTWORS schemes for differ- 404
ent self-interference and interference factors, where (β, α) = 405
(0.95, 0.06) and (β, α) = (0.99, 0.02) are considered. Observe 406
from Fig. 4 that as the artificial noise parameters of (0.95, 0.06) 407
are changed to (0.99, 0.02), the IP versus OP performance 408
of the ANaTWORS scheme improves. Furthermore, Fig. 4 409
also illustrates that the proposed ANaTWORS scheme outper- 410
forms the direct transmission, the ORS and the OSJ-MMISR 411
schemes in terms of its IP versus OP tradeoff for both the 412
(β, α) = (0.95, 0.06) and (β, α) = (0.99, 0.02) cases, since the 413
CSI of the eavesdropper links cannot be readily acquired, the 414
CSIs of the wiretap links are not taken into account in the pro- 415
posed ANaTWORS scheme. For the sake of a fair comparison, 416
the CSIs of the wiretap links in the OSJ-MMISR scheme [30] 417
are not considered either. 418
Fig. 5 shows the IP versus OP of the direct transmission, of the 419
ORS and of the ANaTWORS schemes for different tele-traffic 420
ratios of S1 and S2, namely, for Rs1/Rs2 = 0.5, Rs1/Rs2 = 1, 421
and Rs1/Rs2 = 2. Observe from Fig. 5 that the ANaTWORS 422
scheme performs best for Rs1/Rs2 = 1. Moreover, the dif- 423
ference remains modest for asymmetric traffic ratios of both 424
Rs1/Rs2 = 0.5 and Rs1/Rs2 = 2. This is due to the fact that 425
for a fixed power allocation case, some of the power will be 426
wasted, when the instantaneous channel gain is sufficiently high 427
and the traffic demand is low. Additionally, no beneficial relia- 428
bility improvement is achieved, despite degrading the security. 429
This is interesting, hence we will adopt an adaptive power al- 430
location scheme for improving the security of wireless trans- 431
missions in our future research. Finally, Fig. 5 also illustrates 432
that the proposed ANaTWORS scheme performs better than the 433
direct transmission and ORS schemes for all three traffic-ratios 434
considered. 435
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Fig. 5. IP versus OP of the direct transmission, ORS and ANaTWORS
schemes for different traffic associated with an MUER of λm e = 0 dB, N = 8,
which were calculated from [24, (33), (34) and [27]], [(24), (19)], and (31) and
(32).
Fig. 6. IP x OP of the direct transmission, ORS and ANaTWORS schemes
with λm e = 0 dB and N = 8, which were calculated from [24, (33), (34) and
[27]], [(24), (19)], and (31) and (32).
Fig. 6 illustrates the (IP x OP) product of the direct transmis-436
sion, of the ORS, and of the ANaTWORS schemes for different437
SNRs. Observe from Fig. 6 that upon increasing the SNR, all438
the schemes can exhibit an (IP x OP) peak, but the maximum (IP439
x OP) product of the proposed ANaTWORS scheme is smallest440
of the three schemes, which demonstrates its superiority.441
V. CONCLUSION442
In this paper, we proposed an ANaTWORS scheme for a443
wireless network consisting of the pair of source nodes S1 and444
S2, and multiple two-way relays Ri , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, com-445
municating in the presence of an eavesdropper. We analyzed the446
SRT performance of both the ANaTWORS and of the traditional447
direct transmission schemes. Moreover, due to the presence of448
CSI estimation errors, it was impossible to guarantee that the449
specially designed artificial noise was projected onto the null 450
space of Ri , hence resulting in a certain amount of interfer- 451
ence imposed on the relays. Hence, the self-interference and the 452
interference factors were taken into account for characterizing 453
the wireless SRTs of the proposed ANaTWORS, where the se- 454
curity and reliability are quantified in terms of the IP and OP, 455
respectively. It was also illustrated that the ANaTWORS scheme 456
outperforms both the conventional direct transmission and the 457
ORS schemes in terms of its (IP x OP) product. Furthermore, 458
as the number of relays increases, the SRT of the ANaTWORS 459
scheme improves. 460
Here, we only explored the allocation of a fixed power to 461
the source nodes and relays nodes. In our future work, we will 462
adopt an adaptive power allocation scheme in this scenario. 463
Specifically, the power can be dynamically allocated according 464
to the near instantaneous channel gain and the traffic demands 465
of users. 466
APPENDIX A 467
Upon introducing the notation of X1 = |hs1i |2 and X2 = 468
|hs2i |2, noting that RVs |hs1i |2 and |hs2i |2 are exponentially 469
distributed and independent of each other. Thus, the proba- 470









Hence, Pr( |hs 1i |
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α |hs 2i |2γs +2
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< Δ1
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where σ2s1i and σ
2
s2i
are the expected values of RVs |hs1i |2 and 474
|hs2i |2, respectively. 475
APPENDIX B 476
Using the law of total probability [34], the term 477
Pr(|hos2 |2 < Δ1) can be rewritten as 478
Pr
(



























|hjs2 |2, |hjs1 |2
)
< |his1 |2, |his1 |2 < |his2 |2
)








|hjs2 |2, |hjs1 |2
)




Υ0 = Pr(|his2 |2 < Δ1, max
j∈Φn −{i}
min(|hjs2 |2, |hjs1 |2) < |his1 |2,
|his1 |2 < |his2 |2)
and481
Υ1 = Pr(|his2 |2 < Δ1, max
j∈Φn −{i}
min(|hjs2 |2, |hjs1 |2) < |his2 |2,









(Υ0 + Υ1). (B.2)
Denoting Xj = min(|hjs2 |2, |hjs1 |2), Y = |his1 |2, X =483
|his2 |2, and V = maxj∈Φn −{i}Xj , since that RVs |his1 |2 and484
|his2 |2 obey exponential distribution and they are independent485




Thus, the PDFs of X and Y are fX (x) = 1σ 2i s 2
exp(− x
σ 2i s 2
)487
and fY (y) = 1σ 2i s 1
exp(− y
σ 2i s 1




















































Noting that RVs |hjs1 |2 and |hjs2 |2 are exponentially490
distributed and independent of each other, based on491
[18], we have Pr(Xj < y) = 1− exp(− yσ 2j s 2 −
y
σ 2j s 1
). Thus,492
∏
j∈Φn −{i} Pr(Xj < y) can be expanded as493
∏
j∈Φn −{i}




























where An (m) represents the mth nonempty subset of Φn − {i},494
and |An (m)| denotes the cardinality of the subset An (m). σ2js1495
and σ2js2 are the expected values of RVs |hjs1 |2 and |hjs2 |2,496
respectively.497
























































































































































where |Φn | denotes the cardinality of the set Φn . 499
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Using (B.5) and (B.8), Υ0 + Υ1 can be expressed as504














































































































































Substituting (B.9) into (B.2), Pr(|hos2 |2 < Δ1) can be 506
obtained. 507
APPENDIX C 508
Let X1 and X2 denote |hs1e |2 and |hs2e |2, respec- 509
tively. Noting that RVs |hs1e |2 and |hs2e |2 are exponen- 510
tially distributed and independent of each other with the 511
means of σ2s1e and σ
2
s2e
, respectively. Hence, the PDFs of 512
X1 and X2 are fX 1(x1) = 1σ 2s 1e exp(−
x1
σ 2s 1e
) and fX 2(x2) = 513
1
σ 2s 2e
exp(− x2σ 2s 2e ), respectively. Due to X1 and X2 are inde- 514
pendent of each other, thus fX 1X 2(x1, x2) = fX 1(x1)fX 2(x2). 515
Pr( |hs 1e |
2
β |hs 2e |2γs +2
< Δ1,
|hs 2e |2
β |hs 1e |2γs +2




β|hs2e |2γs + 2
< Δ1,
|hs2e |2


































Using the law of total probability [34], Pr(|hoe |2 > Δ) can 518
be written as 519
Pr
(


































|his2 |2, |his1 |2
))
. (D.1)
We Denote Xj = min(|hjs2 |2, |hjs1 |2), Y = min(|his2 |2, 520
|his1 |2), and V maxj∈Φn −{i} Xj . As mentioned above, RVs 521
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|hjs1 |2, |hjs2 |2, |his1 |2, and |his2 |2 are exponentially522
distributed and independent of each other. Thus, Pr523
(maxj∈Φn −{i} min(|hjs2 |2, |hjs1 |2) < min(|his2 |2, |his1 |2))524










































Pr (Xj < y)
⎞
⎠ dy. (D.2)
As mentioned above, Pr(Y < y) = 1− exp(− y
σ 2i s 2
− y
σ 2i s 1
),526





















































































































where σ2ie is the expected value of RV |hie |2.531
Substituting (D.4) and (D.5) into (D.1), Pr(|hoe |2 > Δ) can532
be obtained.533
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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the physical-layer secu-5
rity of cooperative communications relying on multiple two-way6
relays using the decode-and-forward (DF) protocol in the pres-7
ence of an eavesdropper, where the eavesdropper appears to tap8
the transmissions of both the source and of the relay. The design9
tradeoff to be resolved is that the throughput is improved by in-10
voking two-way relaying, but the secrecy of wireless transmissions11
may be degraded, since the eavesdropper may overhear the signals12
transmitted by both the source and relay nodes. We conceive an13
artificial noise aided two-way opportunistic relay selection (ANaT-14
WORS) scheme for enhancing the security of the pair of source15
nodes communicating with the assistance of multiple two-way re-16
lays. Furthermore, we analyze both the outage probability and17
intercept probability of the proposed ANaTWORS scheme, where18
the security and reliability are characterized in terms of the inter-19
cept probability and the security outage probability. For compari-20
son, we also provide the security–reliability tradeoff (SRT) analysis21
of both the traditional direct transmission and of the one-way re-22
laying schemes. It is shown that the proposed ANaTWORS scheme23
outperforms both the conventional direct transmission, as well as24
the one-way relay methods in terms of its SRT. More specifically,25
in the low main-user-to-eavesdropper ratio (MUER) region, the26
proposed ANaTWORS scheme is capable of guaranteeing secure27
transmissions, whereas no SRT gain is achieved by conventional28
one-way relaying. In fact, the one-way relaying scheme may even29
be inferior to the traditional direct transmission scheme in terms30
of its SRT.31
Index Terms—Artificial noise, opportunistic relay selection,32
physical-layer security, security-reliability tradeoff (SRT),33
two-way relay.34
I. INTRODUCTION35
COOPERATIVE relaying has attracted substantial re-36 search interests from both the academic and industrial37
community, since it is capable of mitigating both the shadowing38
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and fast-fading effects of wireless channels. There are two pop- 39
ular relaying protocols, namely the amplify-and-forward (AF) 40
[1], [2] as well as the decode-and-forward (DF) [3], [4]. In the 41
case of AF relaying, the selected relay multiplies its received 42
signals by a gain factor and then forward them to the destination 43
[1], [2]. By contrast, the DF relay decodes its received signals 44
and then the selected relay forward its decoded signal to the 45
destination [3], [4]. Additionally, in [5], both AF and DF relay- 46
ing schemes are investigated. In general, closer to the source, 47
DF relaying has a high probability of successful decoding and 48
flawless retransmission from the relay to the destination from 49
a reduced distance [6]. By contrast, close to the destination the 50
DF relay has just as bad reception as the destination itself, hence 51
it often inflicts error propagation. Fortunately in the vicinity of 52
the destination AF relying tends to outperform DF relaying [6]. 53
Additionally, [7] also shows that adaptive DF outperforms AF 54
in terms of its frame error rate (FER). 55
At the time of writing this paper, physical-layer security [8], 56
[9] in cooperative relay networks is receiving a growing research 57
attention as benefit of its capability of protecting wireless com- 58
munications against eavesdropping attacks. In [10] and [11], the 59
physical-layer security of MIMO-aided relaying networks has 60
been explored, demonstrating that the secrecy capacity can in- 61
deed be improved by using MIMO-aided relays. Additionally, Q162
Tekin and Yener [12] proposed the cooperative jamming philos- 63
ophy, and studied the attainable secrecy rate with the objective of 64
improving the physical-layer security. As a further development, 65
Long et al. [13] investigated cooperative jamming schemes in 66
bidirectional secrecy communications. In [14] and [15], beam- 67
forming techniques have been investigated and significant wire- 68
less secrecy capability improvements were demonstrated with 69
the aid of beamforming techniques. Additionally, the impact of 70
antenna selection on secure two-way relaying communications 71
has been analyzed in [16]. 72
As a design alternative, relay selection schemes may also 73
be used for improving the physical-layer security of wireless 74
communications. One-way relaying has been analyzed in [17]– 75
[24]. Specifically, hybrid relaying and jamming schemes are 76
explored in [17]–[22]. In [17]–[19], joint AF relaying and jam- 77
mer selection schemes have been investigated. Additionally, hy- 78
brid cooperative beamforming and cooperative jamming have 79
been proposed in [20] and [21]. In [22], joint DF relaying and 80
cooperative jamming schemes have been investigated. More- 81
over, in [23], the AF- and DF-based optimal relay selection 82
schemes have been proposed. The associated intercept probabil- 83
ities have also been analyzed in the context of both AF- and DF- 84
based one-way relaying schemes, where an eavesdropper is only 85
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capable of wiretapping the transmissions of the relays. By con-86
trast, in [24], an eavesdropper was tapping the transmissions87
of both the source and of the relays. Moreover, the security-88
reliability tradeoff (SRT) has been explored in the context of the89
proposed opportunistic relay selection scheme in the high main-90
user-to-eavesdropper ratio (MUER) region, where the MUER91
is defined as the ratio of the average channel gain of the main92
links (spanning from the source to the destination) to that of the93
wiretap links (spanning from the source to the eavesdropper).94
Additionally, two-way relaying has been explored in [25]–[31].95
Specifically, Mo et al. [25] investigated two-way AF relaying96
schemes relying on either two slots or three slots demonstrated97
that the three-slot scheme performs better than the two-slot98
scheme, when the transmitted source powers approach zero.99
In [26], DF relaying has been invoked for improving the wire-100
less security of bidirectional communications, where a relay101
is invoked for transmitting artificial noise in order to perturb102
the eavesdropper’s reception both in the first and in the sec-103
ond transmission slot. In [27], joint relay and jammer selection104
of two-way relay networks have been proposed. In [28], Wang105
et al. explored hybrid cooperative beamforming and jamming106
of two-way relay networks. In [29], secure relay and jammer se-107
lection was conceived for the physical-layer security improve-108
ment of a wireless network having multiple intermediate nodes109
and eavesdroppers, where the links between the source and the110
eavesdropper are not considered. In [30], three different cat-111
egories of relay and jammer selection have been considered,112
where the channel coefficients between the legitimate nodes113
and the eavesdroppers are used both for relay selection and for114
jammer selection. In [31], a wireless network consisting of two115
source nodes is considered and multiple DF relay nodes are116
involved in the presence of a single eavesdropper. The outage117
probability (OP) has been analyzed for the two-way DF scheme118
relying on three transmission slots.119
Motivated by the above considerations, we investigate a wire-120
less network supporting a pair of source nodes with the aid of N121
two-way DF relays in the presence of an eavesdropper. In con-122
trast to [17]–[24], we explore a two-way relaying aided wireless123
network. Furthermore, we propose an artificial noise aided two-124
way opportunistic relay selection (ANaTWORS) scheme, and125
analyze the SRT of the wireless network investigated. Due to the126
channel state information (CSI) estimation error, it is impossible127
to guarantee that no interference is received at the relay nodes,128
caused by the specially designed artificial noise. Moreover, the129
impact of the artificial noise both on the relays and on the130
eavesdropper is characterized, which will be taken into account131
when evaluating the wireless SRT of the proposed ANaTWORS132
scheme. Against this background, the main contributions of this133
paper are summarized as follows.134
First, we propose an ANaTWORS scheme for protecting the135
ongoing transmissions against eavesdropping. To be specific, in136
the first time slot, S1 transmits its signals to the relays, and S2137
transmits artificial noise in order to protect the signals trans-138
mitted by S1 against eavesdropping. Similarly to the first time139
slot, S2 transmits its signals to the relays in the second time140
slot under the protection of artificial noise transmitted by S1. In141
Fig. 1. Wireless network consisting of a pair of source S1, S2, and N relays
in the presence of an eavesdropper E .
the third time slot, the relay forward the encoded signals to S1 142
and S2. 143
Second, we present the mathematical SRT analysis of the pro- 144
posed ANaTWORS scheme in the presence of artificial noise 145
imposed both on the relays and on the eavesdropper for trans- 146
mission over Rayleigh fading channels. Moreover, we assume 147
that the teletraffic of S1 and S2 is different. Closed-form ex- 148
pressions are obtained both for the OP and for the intercept 149
probability (IP) of both S1 and S2. 150
Finally, it is shown that as the impact of artificial noise on the 151
main link is reduced and on the wiretap link is increased, the 152
SRT of the proposed ANaTWORS scheme is improved. Fur- 153
thermore, our performance evaluations reveal that the proposed 154
ANaOTWRS scheme consistently outperforms both the tradi- 155
tional direct transmission regime and the one-way transmission 156
scheme [24] in terms of its SRT. 157
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, 158
we briefly characterize the physical-layer security of a two-way 159
wireless network. In Section III, the SRT analysis of the con- 160
ventional direct transmission scheme as well as of the proposed 161
ANaOTWRS scheme communicating over a Rayleigh chan- 162
nel is carried out. Our performance evaluations are detailed in 163
Section IV. Finally, in Section V, we conclude the paper. 164
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND RELAY SELECTION 165
A. System Model 166
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a wireless network con- 167
sisting of a pair of source nodes, denoted by S1 and S2, plus 168
N two-way DF relays, denoted by Ri , i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, which 169
communicate in the presence of an eavesdropper E, where 170
E is assumed to be within the coverage area of S1, S2, and 171
Ri . All nodes are equipped with a single antenna. We assume 172
that there is no direct link between S1 and S2 due to the path 173
loss. Furthermore, in the spirit of [21], both the main and the 174
wiretap links are modeled by Rayleigh fading channels, where 175
the main and wiretap links are represented by the solid and 176
dashed lines in Fig. 1, respectively. Let hs1i , hs2i , hs1e , and 177
hs2e , i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, represent the S1 −Ri , S2 −Ri , S1 − E, 178
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and S2 − E channel gains, respectively. We assume that the179
channel coefficients hs1i , hs2i , hs1e , and hs2e are mutually inde-180
pendent zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables (RVs)181
with variances of σ2s1i , σ
2
s2i




over, we assume that the S1 −Ri and S2 −Ri links are recip-183
rocal, i.e., we have, hs1i = his1 and hs2i = his2 . For simplicity,184















e , where σ2m and σ2e represent the average chan-186
nel gains of the main links and of the wiretap links, respec-187
tively. Moreover, let λme = σ2m/σ2e , which is referred to as the188
MUER.189
The thermal noise of any node is modeled as a complex Gaus-190
sian random variable with a zero mean and a variance of N0,191
denoted by ns1 , ns2 , ni , and ne , respectively. Following [31],192
the operation of the two-way DF scheme relying on opportunis-193
tic relay selection is split into three time slots. We assume that194
the nodes in the network are synchronized with each other. In195
the first time slot, S1 transmits its signal, denoted by xs1 to the196
relays, and then S2 transmits the artificial noise ωs2 simultane-197
ously. In the second time slot, S2 transmits its signal xs2 to the198
relays and S1 transmits artificial noise simultaneously. In the199
third time slot, the selected relay forward the signal xr to both200
S1 and S2, where we have xr = xs1 ⊕ xs2 , and ⊕ denotes the201
XOR operation. Furthermore, the proposed relay selection can202
be coordinated by relying on a distributed pattern (governed by203
a timer). Without loss of generality, we assume E[|xsj |2] = 1,204
E[|ωsj |2] = N0, j = 1, 2.205
Furthermore, we also assume that S1 and S2 have to convey206
different-rate traffic, denoted by Rs1 and Rs2 , respectively. For207
comparison, the one-way relaying scheme (ORS) of [24] can208
be simply extended to a two-way scenario relying on four time209
slots. To be specific, S1 transmits its signals to the relays in210
the first time slot, S2 transmits its signals to the relays in the211
second time slot, and the selected relay forward the decoded212
signals to S2 and S1 in the third time slot and the fourth time213
slot, respectively.214
B. Two-Way Relaying Scheme215
In this section, we first consider the physical-layer security216
of the two-way relaying scheme. We then propose our ANaT-217
WORS arrangement.218
1) S1 and S2 Transmit: In the first time slot, S1 transmits its219
signal to the relays under the protection of artificial noise trans-220
mitted by S2. For the sake of a fair power consumption com-221
parison with both the direct transmission and the ORS schemes,222
the total transmit power of S1 and S2 is constrained to Ps , thus223
the transmit powers of S1 and S2 are denoted by Ps/2. As men-224
tioned above, it is impossible to guarantee that the artificial noise225
perfectly lies in the null space of the S1 −Ri channels, due to226
the ubiquitous CSI estimation error, hence leading to a certain227
interference received at Ri . The impact of the artificial noise on228
Ri is quantified by α. The signals received at Ri transmitted by229





αPs/2ωs2 + ni. (1)








α|hs2i |2γs + 2
)
(2)
where the factor 1/3 arises from the fact that three orthogonal 233
time slots are required for completing the signal transmission 234
from S1 to S2 via Ri . 235
Naturally, the artificial noise is specially designed to interfere 236
with the eavesdropper. However, its perturbation imposed on the 237
eavesdropper may be imperfect due to CSI estimation errors, 238
which is characterized by β. Hence, the signals received at E 239





βPs/2ωs2 + ne. (3)








β|hs2e |2γs + 2
)
. (4)
In the second time slot, S2 transmits its signals to the relay 243
nodes, and S1 simultaneously transmits artificial noise. Sim- 244






αPs/2ωs1 + ni. (5)







α|hs1i |2γs + 2
)
. (6)






βPs/2ωs1 + ne, (7)







β|hs1e |2γs + 2
)
. (8)
2) Decoding Set: In this section, we analyze the suc- 251
cessful decoding set of the wireless network portrayed in 252
Fig. 1. As shown in [24], the resultant successful de- 253
coding set of the ORS scheme is given by Ω, where 254
Ω = {φ,D1,D2, . . . , Dn , . . . ,D2N −1}, φ denotes the empty 255
set and Φn represents the nth nonempty subset of the N re- 256
lays, n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2N − 1}. The successful decoding sets of 257
the relays defined as those that are capable of successfully 258
decoding xs1 and xs2 are denoted by Ω1 and Ω2, respec- 259
tively. Consequently, the set of the relays that successfully 260
decode both xs1 and xs2 is denoted by Ψ, which is formu- 261
lated as Ψ = {φ,Φ1,Φ2, . . . ,Φn , . . . ,Φ2N −1}, where we have 262
Ψ = Ω1 ∩ Ω2. 263
For example, the decoding sets of Ωj and Ψ have been shown 264
as Table I, where we have N = 3 and j ∈ {1, 2}. 265
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TABLE I
DECODING SETS OF Ωj AND Ψ, WHEN N = 3 AND WHEN j ∈ {1, 2}
As mentioned above, the event of Φ = φ can be characterized266
as267
Cs1i < Rs1 or Cs2i < Rs2 , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} (9)
while the event of Φ = Φn can be expressed as268
Cs1i > Rs1 and Cs2i > Rs2 , i ∈ Φn
Cs1j < Rs1 or Cs2j < Rs2 , j ∈ Φ¯n (10)
where Φ¯n represents the complementary set of Φn .269
3) Relay Transmits: Without loss of generality, here we as-270
sume that Ri is selected from the set Φn . Then the selected relay271
Ri broadcasts the encoded signal xr to S1 and S2. The signals272
received at S1 from Ri can be written as273
ys1 (i) = his1
√
Psxr + ns1 . (11)
The source S1 may invoke successive interference cancelation274
(SIC), thus, (18) can be written as275
ys1 (i) = his1
√
Psxs2 + ns1 . (12)





1 + |his1 |2γs
)
. (13)
Similarly, S2 can also invoke SIC, thus the signals received277
at S2 from Ri can be written as278
ys2 (i) = his2
√
Psxs1 + ns2 . (14)





1 + |his2 |2γs
)
. (15)
The signals received at E from Ri can be written as280
yie = hie
√
Psxr + ne = hie
√
Ps (xs1 ⊕ xs2) + ne. (16)
4) An Optimal Two-Way Relay Selection Criterion: In281
this section, we present the relay selection criterion of the282
ANaTWORS scheme, which can be given by 283
o = arg max
i∈Φn






|his1 |2, |his2 |2
)]
(17)
where o denotes the selected optimal relay. Moreover, from a 284
more practical point of view, the CSIs |his1 |2 and |his2 |2 can be 285
estimated in practical wireless communications, using channel 286
estimation schemes [32]. 287
5) Condition of Intercept Event: In theΦ = φ case, an eaves- 288
dropper can successfully wiretap the signal transmitted by S1, 289
when Css1e > Rs1 . 290
In the Φ = Φn and Css1e > Rs1 case, an eavesdropper can 291
successfully wiretap the signal transmitted by S1. 292
In the Φ = Φn and Css1e < Rs1 scenario, if C
s
s2e
< Rs2 , an 293
eavesdropper cannot successfully wiretap the signal transmit- 294




Psxs1 + ne. (18)





1 + |hoe |2γs
)
. (19)
Clearly, in the Φ = Φn and Css1e < Rs1 case, an eavesdropper 298
can only successfully wiretap the signal transmitted by S1 when 299
Css2e > Rs2 and Coe > Rs1 . 300
Similarly, we can formulate the condition of an eavesdropper 301
successfully wiretapping the signal transmitted by S2 as 302
In the Φ = φ case, an eavesdropper can successfully wiretap 303
the signal transmitted by S2, provided that Css2e > Rs2 . 304
In the Φ = Φn and Css2e > Rs2 scenario, an eavesdropper can 305
successfully wiretap the signal transmitted by S2. 306
In the Φ = Φn , Css2e < Rs2 , C
s
s1e
> Rs1 , and Coe > Rs2 307
case, an eavesdropper can successfully wiretap the signal trans- 308
mitted by S1. 309
III. SECURITY–RELIABILITY TRADEOFF ANALYSIS 310
OVER RAYLEIGH FADING CHANNELS 311
In this section, we analyze both the OP and IP of the proposed 312
ANaTWORS schemes over Rayleigh fading channels. 313
A. SRT Analysis of the Proposed ANaTWORS Scheme 314
1) SRT Analysis of S1: In the ANaTWORS scheme, a relay 315
will only be chosen from the set Φn . With the aid of Shannon 316
[33] and the law of total probability [34], the OP of the S1 → S2 317
link relying on the ANaTWORS scheme can be formulated as 318




Pr (Cos2 < Rs1 ,Φ = Φn ). (20)
In the case of Φ = φ, no relay is chosen for forwarding the 319
signals, which leads to Cos2 = 0 for Φ = φ. Thus, (20) can be 320
DING et al.: SECURITY-RELIABILITY TRADEOFF ANALYSIS OF ARTIFICIAL NOISE AIDED TWO-WAY OPPORTUNISTIC RELAY SELECTION 5
rewritten as321
P singleout s1 = Pr (Φ = φ) +
2N −1∑
n=1
Pr (Cos2 < Rs1 ,Φ = Φn ). (21)
Based on (9) and (10), (21) can be expressed as322





















































|hos2 |2 < Δ1
))
(22)
where we have Δ1 = (23·Rs 1 − 1)/γs , and Δ2 =323
(23·Rs 2 − 1)/γs .324
Based on Appendix A, Pr( |hs 1i |
2
α |hs 2i |2γs +2















































































































































































Substituting (23) and (24) into (22), P singleout s1 can be obtained. 330
In our ANaTWORS scheme, an eavesdropper can overhear 331
the signals transmitted by S1, S2, and Ri . Using the law of total 332
probability [34] and the definition of an intercept event, we can 333
express the IP of the S1 → E link as 334
P singleint s1 = Pr
(














Css1e < Rs1 , C
s
s2e




Using (4), (8), and (19), (25) can be expressed as 335









































































α|hs2i |2γs + 2
> Δ1
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β|hs2e |2γs + 2
< Δ1,
|hs2e |2





|hoe |2 > Δ1
)]
. (26)




β|hs2e |2γs + 2
< Δ1,
|hs2e |2







β|hs2e |2γs + 2
< Δ1,
|hs2e |2































































Substituting (27) and (28) into (26), P singleint s1 can be obtained.341
2) SRT Analysis of S2: Similarly to S1, the OP of S2 can be342
expressed as343
P singleout s2 = Pr (Φ = φ) +
2N −1∑
n=1
Pr (Cos1 < Rs2 ,Φ = Φn ). (29)
Meanwhile, the IP of S2 can be shown to obey344
P singleint s2 = Pr
(














Css2e < Rs2 , C
s
s1e




Clearly, P singleout s2 and P
single
int s2 can be obtained similarly to P
single
out s1 345
and P singleint s1 . 346
3) SRT analysis of S1 and S2: The IP and OP of the pair 347
of sources is defined as the average IP and OP of S1 and S2, 348
respectively: 349
P singleint =












IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 351
For comparison, the SRT analysis of the conventional direct 352
transmission scheme operating without relays is also provided. 353
The total IP and OP of S1 and S2 with the traditional direct 354
transmission scheme is defined as 355
P directint =












respectively, wherein P directint s1 , P
direct
int s2 , P
direct
out s1 , and P
direct
out s2 357
are given by P directint s1 = exp(− Λ1σ 2s 1e ), P
direct
int s2 = exp(− Λ2σ 2s 2e ), 358
P directout s1 = 1− exp(− Λ1σ 2s 1s 2 ), and P
direct
out s2 = 1− exp(− Λ2σ 2s 2s 2 ), re- 359
spectively. Moreover, we have Λ1 = (22Rs 1 − 1)/γs and Λ2 = 360
(22Rs 2 − 1)/γs . Noting that σ2s2s1 , σ2s1e , and σ2s2e are the 361
expected values of the RVs |hs2s1 |2, |hs1e |2, and |hs2e |2, 362
respectively. 363
In this section, we present both our numerical and simulation 364
results for the traditional direct transmission, as well as for 365
the ORS [24] and for the ANaTWORS schemes in terms of 366
their SRTs. Moreover, the analytic IP versus OP results of the 367
direct transmission and ANaTWORS schemes are obtained by 368
plotting (33), (34), (31), and (32), respectively. It is pointed that 369
the IP versus OP results of the ORS scheme are calculated from 370
(27) and (19) of [24], where α is rewritten as (24Rd − 1)/γs . 371
Throughout this performance evaluation, we assumed αs1i = 372
αs2i = αs1e = αs2e = αs1s2 = 1. 373
We first consider the effect of different MUERs. Fig. 2 de- 374
picts the SRTs of both the direct transmission, of the ORS [24] 375
and of the ANaTWORS schemes for different MUERs. Both 376
the numerical and simulation results characterizing the SRT 377
of the ANaTWORS scheme are provided in this figure. Ob- 378
serve from Fig. 2 that as the MUER decreases, all the IPs of 379
the direct transmission, of the ORS and of the ANaTWORS 380
schemes are increased, which can be explained by observing 381
that upon decreasing the MUER, an eavesdropper can achieve 382
a higher achievable rate. Moreover, Fig. 2 also illustrates that 383
the proposed ANaTWORS scheme generally has a lower IP 384
than the traditional direct transmission and ORS regime for 385
MUER = 3 dB and MUER = 0 dB. Additionally, the dif- 386
ference between the analytic and simulated IP versus OP curves 387
DING et al.: SECURITY-RELIABILITY TRADEOFF ANALYSIS OF ARTIFICIAL NOISE AIDED TWO-WAY OPPORTUNISTIC RELAY SELECTION 7
Fig. 2. IP versus OP of the direct transmission, ORS, and ANaTWORS
schemes for different MUERs λm e and for N = 8, which were calculated
from [24, (33), (34) and [27]], [(24), (19)], and (31) and (32).
Fig. 3. IP versus OP of the direct transmission, ORS and ANaTWORS
schemes for different number of relays associated with an MUER of λm e =
0 dB, which were calculated from [24, (33), (34) and [27]], [(24), (19)], and
(31) and (32).
of the ANaTWORS scheme is negligible, demonstrating the388
accuracy of our SRT analysis.389
In Fig. 3, we show the IP verus OP performance of both the di-390
rect transmission, as well as of the ORS and of the ANaTWORS391
scheme for different number of relays N . We can observe from392
Fig. 3 that as the number of relays N increases from N = 4393
to 8, the IP of all schemes is reduced at a specific OP, which394
means that increasing the number of relays improves the security395
versus reliability tradeoff of wireless transmissions. Addition-396
ally, Fig. 3 also demonstrates that IP versus OP performance397
of the proposed ANaTWORS scheme is better than that of the398
direct transmission and of the ORS schemes for all the N values399
considered.400
Fig. 4. IP versus OP of the direct transmission, ORS, OSJ-MMISR, and
ANaTWORS schemes for different α and β associated with an MUER of
λm e = 0 dB, N = 8, which were calculated from [24, (33), (34) and [27]],
[(24), (19)], and (31) and (32).
Fig. 4 illustrates the IP versus OP of both the direct trans- 401
mission, as well as of the ORS, of the optimal selection 402
with jamming with max–min instantaneous secrecy rate (OSJ- 403
MMISR) [30] and of the ANaTWORS schemes for differ- 404
ent self-interference and interference factors, where (β, α) = 405
(0.95, 0.06) and (β, α) = (0.99, 0.02) are considered. Observe 406
from Fig. 4 that as the artificial noise parameters of (0.95, 0.06) 407
are changed to (0.99, 0.02), the IP versus OP performance 408
of the ANaTWORS scheme improves. Furthermore, Fig. 4 409
also illustrates that the proposed ANaTWORS scheme outper- 410
forms the direct transmission, the ORS and the OSJ-MMISR 411
schemes in terms of its IP versus OP tradeoff for both the 412
(β, α) = (0.95, 0.06) and (β, α) = (0.99, 0.02) cases, since the 413
CSI of the eavesdropper links cannot be readily acquired, the 414
CSIs of the wiretap links are not taken into account in the pro- 415
posed ANaTWORS scheme. For the sake of a fair comparison, 416
the CSIs of the wiretap links in the OSJ-MMISR scheme [30] 417
are not considered either. 418
Fig. 5 shows the IP versus OP of the direct transmission, of the 419
ORS and of the ANaTWORS schemes for different tele-traffic 420
ratios of S1 and S2, namely, for Rs1/Rs2 = 0.5, Rs1/Rs2 = 1, 421
and Rs1/Rs2 = 2. Observe from Fig. 5 that the ANaTWORS 422
scheme performs best for Rs1/Rs2 = 1. Moreover, the dif- 423
ference remains modest for asymmetric traffic ratios of both 424
Rs1/Rs2 = 0.5 and Rs1/Rs2 = 2. This is due to the fact that 425
for a fixed power allocation case, some of the power will be 426
wasted, when the instantaneous channel gain is sufficiently high 427
and the traffic demand is low. Additionally, no beneficial relia- 428
bility improvement is achieved, despite degrading the security. 429
This is interesting, hence we will adopt an adaptive power al- 430
location scheme for improving the security of wireless trans- 431
missions in our future research. Finally, Fig. 5 also illustrates 432
that the proposed ANaTWORS scheme performs better than the 433
direct transmission and ORS schemes for all three traffic-ratios 434
considered. 435
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Fig. 5. IP versus OP of the direct transmission, ORS and ANaTWORS
schemes for different traffic associated with an MUER of λm e = 0 dB, N = 8,
which were calculated from [24, (33), (34) and [27]], [(24), (19)], and (31) and
(32).
Fig. 6. IP x OP of the direct transmission, ORS and ANaTWORS schemes
with λm e = 0 dB and N = 8, which were calculated from [24, (33), (34) and
[27]], [(24), (19)], and (31) and (32).
Fig. 6 illustrates the (IP x OP) product of the direct transmis-436
sion, of the ORS, and of the ANaTWORS schemes for different437
SNRs. Observe from Fig. 6 that upon increasing the SNR, all438
the schemes can exhibit an (IP x OP) peak, but the maximum (IP439
x OP) product of the proposed ANaTWORS scheme is smallest440
of the three schemes, which demonstrates its superiority.441
V. CONCLUSION442
In this paper, we proposed an ANaTWORS scheme for a443
wireless network consisting of the pair of source nodes S1 and444
S2, and multiple two-way relays Ri , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, com-445
municating in the presence of an eavesdropper. We analyzed the446
SRT performance of both the ANaTWORS and of the traditional447
direct transmission schemes. Moreover, due to the presence of448
CSI estimation errors, it was impossible to guarantee that the449
specially designed artificial noise was projected onto the null 450
space of Ri , hence resulting in a certain amount of interfer- 451
ence imposed on the relays. Hence, the self-interference and the 452
interference factors were taken into account for characterizing 453
the wireless SRTs of the proposed ANaTWORS, where the se- 454
curity and reliability are quantified in terms of the IP and OP, 455
respectively. It was also illustrated that the ANaTWORS scheme 456
outperforms both the conventional direct transmission and the 457
ORS schemes in terms of its (IP x OP) product. Furthermore, 458
as the number of relays increases, the SRT of the ANaTWORS 459
scheme improves. 460
Here, we only explored the allocation of a fixed power to 461
the source nodes and relays nodes. In our future work, we will 462
adopt an adaptive power allocation scheme in this scenario. 463
Specifically, the power can be dynamically allocated according 464
to the near instantaneous channel gain and the traffic demands 465
of users. 466
APPENDIX A 467
Upon introducing the notation of X1 = |hs1i |2 and X2 = 468
|hs2i |2, noting that RVs |hs1i |2 and |hs2i |2 are exponentially 469
distributed and independent of each other. Thus, the proba- 470









Hence, Pr( |hs 1i |
2
α |hs 2i |2γs +2
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where σ2s1i and σ
2
s2i
are the expected values of RVs |hs1i |2 and 474
|hs2i |2, respectively. 475
APPENDIX B 476
Using the law of total probability [34], the term 477
Pr(|hos2 |2 < Δ1) can be rewritten as 478
Pr
(



























|hjs2 |2, |hjs1 |2
)
< |his1 |2, |his1 |2 < |his2 |2
)








|hjs2 |2, |hjs1 |2
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Υ0 = Pr(|his2 |2 < Δ1, max
j∈Φn −{i}
min(|hjs2 |2, |hjs1 |2) < |his1 |2,
|his1 |2 < |his2 |2)
and481
Υ1 = Pr(|his2 |2 < Δ1, max
j∈Φn −{i}
min(|hjs2 |2, |hjs1 |2) < |his2 |2,









(Υ0 + Υ1). (B.2)
Denoting Xj = min(|hjs2 |2, |hjs1 |2), Y = |his1 |2, X =483
|his2 |2, and V = maxj∈Φn −{i}Xj , since that RVs |his1 |2 and484
|his2 |2 obey exponential distribution and they are independent485




Thus, the PDFs of X and Y are fX (x) = 1σ 2i s 2
exp(− x
σ 2i s 2
)487
and fY (y) = 1σ 2i s 1
exp(− y
σ 2i s 1




















































Noting that RVs |hjs1 |2 and |hjs2 |2 are exponentially490
distributed and independent of each other, based on491
[18], we have Pr(Xj < y) = 1− exp(− yσ 2j s 2 −
y
σ 2j s 1
). Thus,492
∏
j∈Φn −{i} Pr(Xj < y) can be expanded as493
∏
j∈Φn −{i}




























where An (m) represents the mth nonempty subset of Φn − {i},494
and |An (m)| denotes the cardinality of the subset An (m). σ2js1495
and σ2js2 are the expected values of RVs |hjs1 |2 and |hjs2 |2,496
respectively.497
























































































































































where |Φn | denotes the cardinality of the set Φn . 499
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Using (B.5) and (B.8), Υ0 + Υ1 can be expressed as504














































































































































Substituting (B.9) into (B.2), Pr(|hos2 |2 < Δ1) can be 506
obtained. 507
APPENDIX C 508
Let X1 and X2 denote |hs1e |2 and |hs2e |2, respec- 509
tively. Noting that RVs |hs1e |2 and |hs2e |2 are exponen- 510
tially distributed and independent of each other with the 511
means of σ2s1e and σ
2
s2e
, respectively. Hence, the PDFs of 512
X1 and X2 are fX 1(x1) = 1σ 2s 1e exp(−
x1
σ 2s 1e
) and fX 2(x2) = 513
1
σ 2s 2e
exp(− x2σ 2s 2e ), respectively. Due to X1 and X2 are inde- 514
pendent of each other, thus fX 1X 2(x1, x2) = fX 1(x1)fX 2(x2). 515
Pr( |hs 1e |
2
β |hs 2e |2γs +2
< Δ1,
|hs 2e |2
β |hs 1e |2γs +2




β|hs2e |2γs + 2
< Δ1,
|hs2e |2


































Using the law of total probability [34], Pr(|hoe |2 > Δ) can 518
be written as 519
Pr
(


































|his2 |2, |his1 |2
))
. (D.1)
We Denote Xj = min(|hjs2 |2, |hjs1 |2), Y = min(|his2 |2, 520
|his1 |2), and V maxj∈Φn −{i} Xj . As mentioned above, RVs 521
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|hjs1 |2, |hjs2 |2, |his1 |2, and |his2 |2 are exponentially522
distributed and independent of each other. Thus, Pr523
(maxj∈Φn −{i} min(|hjs2 |2, |hjs1 |2) < min(|his2 |2, |his1 |2))524










































Pr (Xj < y)
⎞
⎠ dy. (D.2)
As mentioned above, Pr(Y < y) = 1− exp(− y
σ 2i s 2
− y
σ 2i s 1
),526





















































































































where σ2ie is the expected value of RV |hie |2.531
Substituting (D.4) and (D.5) into (D.1), Pr(|hoe |2 > Δ) can532
be obtained.533
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